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When is it democratic to postpone an election? 





Holding regular elections are an essential feature of democratic practices.  The case for 
postponing elections is often made during emergency situations, however. Despite the 
critical nature of the issue for democracy, peace and security, there has been sparse 
academic literature on election postponement.  This article provides a new typology of 
reasons why elections might be delayed to disentangle the causal factors and normative 
rationale. It distinguishes the humanitarian case for temporary postponements during 
natural disasters.  It then argues that substantive concepts of democracy and electoral 
integrity, rather than existing international/national laws and standards, should be used 
to inform decisions about postponement by relevant stakeholders, be it an electoral 
management body (EMB), government, parliament or the judiciary. The possible effects 
of natural disasters on electoral integrity are traced through a comparative analysis of 
past cases. The article holds that variations in context and the ability actors to 
strategically adapt to situations will make the effects contingent.  Nonetheless, holding 
elections during natural disasters will often lead to severely compromised opportunities 
for deliberation, contestation, participation and election management quality.  There is 
therefore strong, democratic case for time-limited postponement.  However, the 
postponement will break institutional certainty, which could pose threats of democratic 
breakdown – especially in presidential systems.  The best available safeguards for 
electoral integrity during natural disasters include the introduction or expansion of low-
tech solutions such as early voting, strengthened risk management but also transparency 
and inclusivity in decision-making.  Overall, there are important lessons for the broader 
scholarship and practice of democracy during emergency situations. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the defining characteristics of a democracy is that it holds regular, periodic elections (Dahl 
1971; Przeworski 1999).  This requirement was famously enshrined into Article 21(3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948).  It is also embedded into many 
conceptualisations of electoral integrity (Norris 2014).  At the same time, there are occasions where a 
natural disaster, such as an epidemic or tsunami may mean that holding an election will potentially 
introduce greater threats to human life and security.  The problem was laid bare as the coronavirus 
pandemic spread in 2020.  Between 21 February and 2 August 2020, at least 69 countries and 
territories across the globe decided to postpone forthcoming elections.  And yet during the same time 
at least 19 countries decided to hold national or subnational elections as originally planned and in 9 
countries those elections took place.  Court case battles ensued elsewhere, with the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court blocking an executive order by the state governor to suspend in-person voting for the 
Presidential primaries in April 2020 (Supreme Court of Wisconsin 2020). 
The question of whether elections should be delayed in such circumstances has rarely been given 
detailed analysis. It has arisen in rare court judgements, such as that in Wisconsin, where arguments 
have principally focussed on constitutionality.  The question, however, is clearly critical for 
practitioners, judicial judgements and democratic theory as it raises much deeper arguments and is 
therefore a major gap in the broader democracy and electoral law literature. 
This article firstly contributes to this literature by providing a new typology of reasons why elections 
might be delayed to disentangle the causal factors and normative rationale.  Seven separate 
categories are set out which include those which are predominately postponed because of the political 
interests of the incumbent, but also those which are postponed for technical reasons, peaceful 
conciliation or humanitarian postponements that might be necessary because holding an election 
during a natural disaster would pose a threat to human life and health.   
Secondly, the article contributes by making the case that the decision of whether to postpone or hold 
an election should be subject to assessment against broader democratic theory rather than 
international law and standards.  The latter provide useful benchmarks, but there is no guarantee that 
these international laws and standards are democratic themselves - or best practice in rapidly 
changing situations.  A substantive theory of democracy is used to identify five key principals of 
electoral integrity which are at risk when natural disasters hit.   
Thirdly, the article makes the case that the effects of natural disasters on electoral integrity is 
unpredictable, not just because the nature of natural disasters and contexts will vary, but because 
actors have agency and can therefore strategically learn and adjust.   ‘Iron laws’ about the effects of 
natural disasters on electoral integrity, may therefore not hold up.  However, the article holds that 
there are major threats to opportunities for deliberation, contestation, participation and election 
management quality posed by natural disasters.  The postponement paradox is that, however, 
postponing will break institutional certainty and this may lead to partisan scrobbling which could 
trigger democratic breakdown and undermine trust in the system – especially presidential systems 
that are used to fixed terms and states with low levels of political trust.  We make specific 
recommendations about how elections could be conducted during natural disasters which are that 
low-tech solutions are used – but also that the process of deciding is as important than what decision.  
The article will begin with a review of the very limited existing research that has been undertaken on 
the postponement of elections.  It will distinguish the new concept of humanitarian postponements 
within a new typology of instances where scheduled elections might not take place or have been 
cancelled at any stage of the electoral cycle to disentangle the causal and normative reasons for this. 
Next, it will scrutinise the case for the humanitarian postponement of elections or electoral 
preparations in the face of looming or actual natural disasters which will threaten human life.  It will 
then compare how holding or postponing an electoral event during emergency situations would affect 
the realisation of five key democratic principles: opportunities for deliberation, equality of 
participation, equality of contestation, electoral management quality and the institutionalisation of 
rules.  Finally, the article outlines the measures that can be taken to protect electoral integrity during 
a natural disaster.  Overall, this article has important consequences lessons for the broader scholarship 
and practice of democracy during emergency situations. 
 
2.  The postponement of elections: what do we know? 
Although elections have been one of the most prominent areas of study in political science (Htun and 
Powell 2013), the elections that do not take place remain systematically understudied and under-
categorised.  There is some provision in international law and standards.  Article 21(3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights notes that states must have regular, periodic elections (UN General 
Assembly 1948).  Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, meanwhile, states 
that ‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties … may take measures derogating from their obligations under 
the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.’ International 
electoral assistance agencies have issued guidance that any emergency provisions must be 
proportionate, non-discriminatory, temporary and limited in scope (Ellena and Shein 2020).  
Political science research is much more limited, however.  Datasets on electoral contests tend to 
measure the quality of electoral integrity or the opinions of voters in elections that have taken place 
(Hyde and Marinov 2012; Kelley 2011; Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018) and the drivers of electoral 
integrity within those events (Birch 2011; James 2020; Norris 2015) - rather than those elections which 
did not take place.  We therefore know little about ‘the dog that didn’t bark in the night.’  Elections 
that do not take place appear to be common, however.  The NELDA dataset on elections lists 144 
states that have had some previous experience of a ‘suspended election’ between 1945-2015  (Hyde 
and Marinov 2012).1  Examples cited in that dataset include civil wars such as the fighting between 
the ruling MPLA and the rebel UNITA in Angola or a military coup such as that under Pervez Musharraf 
as the Pakistani leader.  
There has been a wider discussion about the timing of elections.  This has considered issues such as 
the effects of early ‘snap’ elections, where it is constitutionally permissible to hold elections earlier 
than planned (Smith 2004).  The timing of elections are also thought to be important with respect to 
post-conflict situations and democratic transitions (Alihodžić and Matatu 2019; Reilly 2002).  Research 
on natural disasters and elections has considered the effects on vote share and turnout (Abney and 
Hill 1966; Flores and Smith 2013).  There has been some discussion about the potential steps that 
election officials can take in the event of a natural disaster in the US, with Stein (2015) examining the 
conduct of the 2012 presidential election in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy.  Morley (2017) similarly 
considered how US states responded to natural disasters such as the 11 September attacks on New 
York City, Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of New Orleans, and the constitutional cases that then 
followed.  There have also been discussions of specific legal cases where courts have been asked to 
intervene to postpone an election, such as the 2013 California Gubernatorial Recall Election (Brady 
 
1 The cited variable is ‘nelda1’ - ‘Were regular elections suspended before this election?’. 
2004).  But once an election has been scheduled, should it take place come what may, or are there 
some circumstances where it should be delayed?  There has been little critical examination of the case 
for postponing elections against democratic theory. 
3.  Seven types of non-elections  
The motives and causes of not holding elections are varied and complex. It is important to distinguish 
these because non-elections are not just power-grabs by autocrats – the most intuitive reason for why 
an election might not take place.  Table 1 therefore presents a new ideal-type typology of non-
elections.  The actors who cancel the election, their rationale and timing vary in each case.  As an ideal-
type typology (Collier, Laporte, and Seawright 2008), cases may not always precisely fit into one single 
category and may have some aspects of each of them.  However, the categories provide an important 
advance in identifying the variety of causes for postponing an election – which can help academics 
and judicial decision-makers determine whether or not they are power grabs and undermine 
democracy – or are actually necessary steps to reinforce democratic ideals. 
  
Cancelled elections are those in which incumbents decide not to hold an electoral event as part of a 
deliberate statecraft power-grab.  These cancellations can be long term or indefinite where, for 
example, power is seized through a military coup.  There are numerous cases of elections being 
suspended for prolonged periods of military dictatorships, such as in Lesotho 1986-1993. Pervez 
Musharaff postponed the 2008 elections in Pakistan. However, they can also be short-term 
cancellations where leaders might be expecting that they will not be successful in a future contest.   
Some Venezuelan elections were postponed in 2016-18 as part of Nicolas Maduro’s strategy to 
undermine opposition parties and their followers, or to buy time to mitigate negative popular opinion 
(Alarcon and Trak 2019, 126-27, 9-30).   
Cancelled elections violate democratic norms, but there are a variety of other reasons why elections 
might not take place.  Deep political crises such as those in FYR Macedonia (2012-16) can cause an 
institutional breakdown, preventing the taking place of scheduled elections (Alihodžić and Matatu 
2019.  Crisis postponements may therefore occur because there is a political stalemate and 
constitutional crisis.  The causes of a non-election are therefore deeply political, but not a direct 
power-grab, and there is no indefinite cancellation of elections.  Parliamentary elections in Egypt were 
postponed in 2013 when an Administrative Court overrode a decree issued by President Mohamed 
Mursi calling the election.  It also returned the electoral law, the subject of feuding between the 
opposition and Mursi’s ruling Islamists, to the Constitutional Court for review, leaving Egypt ‘in limbo’ 
(Saleh 2013). Similarly, the Constitutional Court in Macedonia declared the dissolution of parliament 
unconstitutional in 2016, thereby cancelling the elections (OSCE/OHDIR 2016).   
Transitional postponements are those where states determine that a broader constitutional 
framework needs to be established before general elections are held.  Both Nepal and Tunisia decided 
to adopt new democratic constitutions before conducting general elections. To do so, they held 
Constitutional Assembly elections Nepal 2008, Tunisia 2011. The 2007 Constitutional Assembly 
elections had to be postponed in Nepal due to the absence of a necessary legislative framework 
(Pokharel and Rana 2019).  The motives of actors in transitional postponements are therefore about 
deepening democratic institutions rather than a power-grab, and the constitutional reforms being put 
in place should involve a clear framework for the holding of elections.   
Technical delays might also be needed.  Elections are huge, complex logistical events which require a 
vast volume of resources, laws and staff (James 2020).   It might therefore be necessary to delay parts 
of the electoral process until staff training has been completed, robust ICT systems have been 
established or electoral registers have been compiled.  The Nigerian 2019 Presidential and national 
assembly elections were postponed by the Independent National Electoral Commission, three days 
before the scheduled elections ‘[f]ollowing a careful review of the implementation of the logistics and 
operational plan’ (Mckenzie, Swails, and Smith-Spark 2019).  The decision was announced only five 
hours before polls were due to open and election put back a week.  Delays can be longer.  The Bosnian 
post-war elections in 1996 were postponed for three months due to technical delays.  The 1991 census 
was to be used as the electoral register – but there were mistakes scanning the data. Meanwhile, voter 
identification was hampered by the problem of issuing documents to internally displaced refugees 
(Hadziabdic 2019). 
Elections might be postponed when there is the death of a candidate.  This situation has been 
described as ‘quite common in local elections’ (Rallings and Thrasher 1997, 44).  This is especially 
problematic where the candidate is individually listed on the ballot paper rather than being a 
candidate through a party-list system.  The procedures for postponement or other steps are usually 
set out in national laws and may depend on the timing of the death with respect to the electoral cycle 
and the affiliation of the candidate (ACE 2020). In the United Kingdom, if an independent candidate 
dies ahead of a parliamentary election then the election continues and is only rerun if the deceased 
candidate receives the most votes.2  If the candidate is representing a political party, however, then 
the election is halted immediately and a new election is called (Electoral Commission 2019, 33).   By 
contrast, in the Republic of Ireland, voting was delayed across the Tipperary constituency in the 2020 
general election when an independent candidate died five days ahead of the polls (Holland 2020).  The 
democratic rationale for postponement is a concern that voter choice would be adversely affected if 
a political party is unrepresented on the ballot paper and parties will be unequally able to contest the 
election.   
An outlier are annulled elections, which are polling events that do take place as scheduled, but which 
subsequently have their result overridden.  This might be by a constitutional court who might judge 
that the election was not constitutional for technical reasons, or because there was evidence of 
widespread electoral fraud (Vickery, Ennis, and Ellena 2018).  For example, the result of the 2019 
Malawi Presidential election was annulled by the Constitutional Court after it ruled that ‘anomalies 
and irregularities have been so widespread, systematic and grave such that the integrity of the result 
was seriously compromised, and can’t be trusted as the will of voters’ (Reuters 2020).  The 2017 
Kenyan presidential elections were annulled after the Supreme Court said that the polls were ’neither 
transparent nor verifiable’, blaming the country’s electoral commission for the shortcomings (Burke 
2017).  Annulled elections are an outlier in so far as the electoral event did take place and the 
cancellation is post-election.  They therefore feature last in the typology.  However, we include them 
because they are like other categories in that they are electoral contests which are scheduled but 
which do not have their results verified.    
We can also distinguish humanitarian postponements where elections might not take place because 
of threats to human life, which are considered in more detail next. 
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Table 1: A typology of delayed elections 
3. The humanitarian case for delaying elections 
The loss of life during electoral events as a result of electoral violence has seen considerable academic 
attention.  This is usually seen through the lens of deliberate attempts to suppress the opposition vote 
or wreck the electoral process as part of a campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the government 
or democratic process (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020; Höglund 2009).  There has been much less 
focus on the loss of life that can occur where no deliberate perpetrators were involved. There is 
enormous scope for this to occur, however.  The National Electoral Commission (KPU) of Indonesia 
reported that over 300 poll workers died as a result of fatigue-related illnesses following the 2019 
elections (Manafe and Yasmin 2019) for example.  
There is an obvious humanitarian case for delaying the conduct of elections where it might bring about 
immediate threats to human life and security.  Electoral democracy is a political system which is valued 
for bringing about democratic ideals – but it is also valued for bringing greater material well-being to 
citizens (Sen 1999b).  Holding elections when they might jeopardise lives would therefore be a 
counter-intuitive use of institutions designed to facilitate individual and collective preservation. 
There are a variety of scenarios in which the loss of life might occur during the electoral process which 
were not the result of deliberate action.  Natural accidents are major adverse physical events, resulting 
from natural processes of the Earth.  They include earthquakes, tsunamis, wildfires, epidemics and 
pandemics (Table 2).  There are many examples worldwide of when holding elections during such 
unexpected events would have threatened human life. The 2019 local elections in Papua New Guinea 
were forced to be postponed because of an eruption of Mount Ulawun, forcing thousands of people 
to be displaced (RNZ 2019). Haiti’s electoral plans were devasted in 2020 by an earthquake (Zengerle 
and Guyler Delva 2010).  Heavy rains from Cyclone Idai killed more than 750 people and forced the 
National Electoral Commission to postpone the electoral census in Mozambique (Machel 2019).  
Climate change forecasts estimate that some of these problems might become more frequent. 
One prominent example of a pandemic was the spread of COVID-19 in 2020.  A pneumonia with an 
unknown cause was detected in Wuhan, China and first reported to the World Health Organisation 
Country Office in China on 31 December 2019.  The outbreak was declared a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern on 30 January 2020.  Cases were rapidly reported around the world and it 
was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation on 11 March 2020 (WHO 2020b).  Between 
21 February and 2 August 2020, at least 69 countries and territories across the globe decided to 
postpone forthcoming elections (International IDEA 2020a).  Elections that have previously been 
postponed for public health reasons include those in light of the Ebola crisis in West Africa (2013-
2016), such as the 2016 Presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the 2014 
senatorial elections in Liberia (Mark 2014).  Meanwhile, during the 2009 epidemics of Swine Flu 
(H1N1) virus in Mexico, campaign restrictions were put in place such as discouraging political rallies of 
more than 40 people, urging candidates not to wear neckties( as they were suspected to be potential 
carriers of viruses), and discouraging kissing (including baby kissing) and handshaking (Lacey and 
Malkin 2009). 
There are major risks of casualties throughout the electoral cycle during a natural disaster because it 
involves the rapid movement and concentration of people within a country and between countries.  
The compilation of the electoral register often requires the posting of registers outside of polling 
stations so that citizens and parties can inspect them and residential properties to be door knocked 
to check the accuracy and completeness of the register. The campaign stage of elections involves 
holding major rallies and political parties reaching out to voters via the canvassing of properties.    
Election day itself can involve the movement of millions of citizens. Many countries do not provide 
external voting opportunities and so citizens must travel from overseas in order to vote (Hartmann 
2015).  Voting involves staffing thousands of polling stations with poll workers - who are often retired 
and elderly (Clark and James 2017).  Counts often take place in crowded areas such as halls or within 
polling stations where social distancing is difficult with many people present.  Touch screen 
equipment, or sharing pens to mark ballot or to sign voter register, are opportunities for the 
transmission of infectious diseases. 
Natural disasters can be distinguished from technological disasters, which are human-made and occur 
in or close to human settlements (Table 2).  Industrial, transport, and other accidents such as rail 
crashes and explosions which are accidental may justify a humanitarian postponement of part of the 
electoral process. A technological failure such as power outages can cause major problems to the 
electoral process now that technology is often central to the electoral process through e-counting and 
electronic poll-books, for example (Loeber 2020).  Some technological disasters, whose causes are 
more complex in nature, might not justify humanitarian postponement. Famines can be caused by 
crop failure owing to environmental conditions – but they are usually also at least partially caused by 
human failure to prevent famine and weak accountability systems (Devereux 2009).  They will 
therefore not usually justify humanitarian postponements.  Famines were famously thought by 
Amartya Sen (1999a, 178) to be prevented by the holding of elections.  But at their peak, unexpected 
famines could place humanitarian strains as state resources address human health and leave public 
services undeliverable.  External wars, civil wars and violence can create situations in which human 
life would be at threat by an election, but they are best diagnosed as crisis postponements. 
Scenario Examples 
Natural hazards Geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanic activity) 
Hydrological (flood, landslide, wave action) 
Climatological (drought, wildfire) 
Meteorological (cyclones, storms) 
Biological (epidemic, pandemic, insect/animal plagues) 





Displaced populations  
Industrial accident 
Transport accident 
Miscellaneous accident (collapse, explosion) 
Technological failure 
Table 2: Examples of emergency situations, source, authors, based on: CRED (2020) 
The humanitarian case for postponing elections is also strictly time-limited to that necessary to make 
elections deliverable, otherwise there are perverse incentives for leaders to exacerbate an emergency 
to deliberately postpone an election.  A protracted emergency would usually give an opportunity for 
electoral officials to put in place alternative election arrangements.  The US outbreak of COVID-19 in 
early 2000, gave sufficient opportunity for postal voting mechanisms to be in place for the November 
2020 US Presidential election, for example (Persily and Stewart III 2020), although there were clear 
legal and political challenges. Emergencies are sometimes anticipatable.  Floods and hurricanes are 
more likely in some regions than others.  Risk assessment and contingency plans can therefore be 
developed.  A late postponement, following a failure to take reasonable action to prepare for an 
election given a known threat, is therefore closer to a cancelled election if there are also partisan 
motives at play. 
4.  Democratic theory in practice 
Although there might be humanitarian reasons for postponing an election, the prospect of not holding 
an election when one is scheduled is, at first glance, contrary to democratic ideals. To assess whether 
postponing elections is in line with democracy and electoral integrity requires definitions of these 
concepts.  If a procedural definition of democracy and electoral integrity is used, which define the 
concepts in terms of whether a particular set of institutional practices are in place (e.g. Dahl 1971; 
Przeworski 1999), then it is possible that any postponement will be considered anti-democratic.  As 
David Beetham argues, the weakness of procedural definitions, however, are that they provide no 
rationale for why these institutions should be considered ‘democratic’, in the first place, rather than, 
say, “liberal”, “pluralist”, “polyachric” or whatever other term we choose’ (Beetham 1994, 26).  
International law may or may not allow the postponement of elections – but does that make this just 
and democratic?  
Democracy, based on the work of David Beetham (1994), is here considered as a system that achieves 
political equality and popular control of government (also see: Beetham et al. 2008; International IDEA 
2019).  This is a substantive theory of democracy that considers whether key principles have been 
achieved, rather than a checklist of procedures.  We define electoral integrity as the realisation of 
principles in the conduct of election that are necessary to support the broader realisation of democratic 
ideals.  Building from Garnett and James (2020) these would include, but are not limited to: 
opportunities for deliberation, equality of participation, equality of contestation, electoral 
management quality and the institutionalisation of rules.   
 
This article now seeks to map some of the underlying causal mechanisms for how natural disasters 
can shape electoral integrity.  This enables the democratic dangers and advantages of election 
postponement/continuation to be identified.  Our argument is that context is important because the 
prior legal, organisational, economic and political relationships will vary.  Key actors such as 
incumbents, political parties and electoral management bodies also have some creative agency and 
may strategically learn to identify and adopt different strategies.  Accurate prediction of the effects of 
natural disasters on electoral integrity may not entirely be possible, but we can better understand 
how the strategic context will change.  This position draws from a realist sociological approach, as set 
out by James (2020, 18-30).  The realist sociological approach conceptualises causation as contextually 
contingent and partially dependent on the reflective agency.  The aim is therefore to identify causal 
mechanisms through past empirical studies, examples and cases (Pawson et al. 2005).   
 
Opportunities for deliberation 
 
One principle is the importance of opportunities for deliberation.  Citizens need, as Dahl put it, full 
opportunities to formulate their preferences (Dahl 1971, 2-3).  This meant freedom to form and join 
organisations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, the right to compete for public office and 
alternative forms of information.  Deliberation requires freedom from explicit and implicit voter 
intimidation so that citizens feel that they can speak freely (Birch and Muchlinski 2018; Schneider and 
Carroll 2020). Less minimalist approaches to democracy place a more demanding expectation on the 
electoral process.  Deliberative democracy theorists point to the importance of societies discussing 
and debating political issues rather than simply aggregating interests.  Conflicts can be dissolved and 
better decisions can be reached through deeper argumentation, dialogue and reflection.  Deliberative 
theorists claim that there would be a democratic deficit if the entirety of citizens’ engagement in the 
political process is at the ballot box and encourage both micro-level deliberative forums and system 
level deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 2009; Mansbridge and Parkinson 2012).  However, 
deliberation during the electoral process, not least the electoral campaign, remains a critical window 
for this to happen.  Deliberation during the electoral campaign is therefore important.  Good 
deliberation, argues James Fishkin (2011, 84-5) requires good quality information, substantive 
balance, a diversity of viewpoints, conscientiousness and equal consideration of the arguments.     
  
Deliberation within the electoral campaign is often not achieved in ‘normal’ times.  Simply holding 
elections is insufficient since there is no guarantee that citizens will actively consider their interests 
and the issues – or that they will vote.  There are therefore often concerns that “zombie” like elections 
could be held characterised by apathy and disengagement (Koch 2017).  Emergencies can, however, 
fundamentally undermine opportunities for deliberation since they depend on information and news 
content from independent journalists.  Media outlets might be reduced to minimal services to 
minimise risks to human life during a natural disaster - or they could become entirely dysfunctional.  
The 2015 Nepal earthquake caused the destruction of newsrooms, partial destruction of 
communications infrastructures, major damage to transport networks.  As a result, journalism 
practices were heavily affected with news production, gathering were heavily constrained and 
journalistic rigour was affected (Sreedharan, Thorsen, and Sharma 2019).  Campaigning can become 
restricted during emergency situations.  Many countries imposed ‘lockdowns’ during the 2020 COVID-
19 epidemic to prevent mass gatherings and citizens leaving their house.  In these circumstances, 
opportunities for campaigning become much more limited.  Individual citizens may also find 
themselves in conversation with a smaller pool of people, if any, outside of their household – giving 
them access to a smaller pool of everyday conversations.   The nature of argumentation can become 
more emotive and less rational during natural disaters, both online and in how politicians repond to 
each other (Al-Saggaf and Simmons 2015).  During the 2009 Swine Flu epidemic, Mexico saw heated 
clashes over the ‘politicisation of the epidemic’ (Al-Saggaf and Simmons 2015).   
Some electoral events can continue during natural disasters – depending on the nature of the disaster.  
TV debates can take place during pandemics without an audience, for example, as they did between 
Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders in March 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic =, in competition to be 
Democratic candidate for the US Presidency. Some commentators argued that the absence of an 
audience enabled the discussion to be more substantive in focus, with fewer crowd-pleasing 
punchlines looking for applause (Grynbaum 2020).  There were also innovative ‘virtual rallies’ during 
the pandemic. Home Minister Amit Shah, of the incumbent Indian BJP, held a rally in June 2020 ahead 
of the Bihar legislative elections which was viewed by 3.9 million people over the internet (PTI 2020).  
At least 15,000 LED screens and 70,000 smart TVs were also installed across West Bengal by the 
governing party to enable citizens to watch the event (Tribune 2020), at a reported cost of Rs 100 
crore (NDTV 2020).  The online rally was not deliberative in nature, however, as it focussed on the 
achievements of the Modi governments and was accompanied with applause from BJP employees 
from the party HQ in Delhi.  
 
Holding an election during an emergency situation is also likely to alter the policy agenda considerably.  
The public debate may become centered on the  ‘focusing events’ of the crisis and the incumbent 
government’s management of this.  Discursive debates and voter intensions may come to be set by 
this single issue.  There is strong evidence that natural disasters do change voter preferences as the 
management of the crisis becomes the salient issue rather than other subjects.  This might be a lifeline 
for those who manage crises well but have a poor record on other issues during the mandate, and vice 
versa. Voters in India over the period 1977–1999 have been shown to have punished the incumbent 
party for weather events beyond its control, but also reward the government for responding well to 
disasters (Cole, Healy, and Werker 2012).  Supporting evidence for voter preferences changing 
because of a natural disaster has also been found in Croatia and the USA (Bovan, Banai, and Banai 
2018). 
Equality of contestation 
 
Elections should have a level playing field for candidates.  There is often some degree of structural 
advantages for parties and candidates, since they will enter the campaign period with a greater 
concentration of resources if they are backed by wealthy donors, meanwhile incumbents might have 
access to state resources such as editorial influence over the state media outlets (Norris and van Es 
2016). 
 
Emergencies can, however, exacerbate some of these tensions. In states where incumbents have 
control over the state media they may be able to continue to use this important campaign tool, with 
opposition parties remain unable to mobilise if they are restricted by ‘lockdowns’ or weak 
communications infrastructures. Polish President Andrzej Duda made television appearances at 
border checkpoints, hospitals, food bank and new production lines of hand sanitizer during the early 
campaign of the 2020 Presidential election, while opposition parties were unable to canvass, and 
Duda’s poll rating rose in the meantime because of COVID019 restrictions (Strzelecki 2020). 
Emergency situations can also bring massive inflows of revenue in the form of donations and 
humanitarian aid, which increases the cash and resources available for buying votes. There is evidence 
that this occurred during the rainy season of 2010–2011 in Colombia, and the subsequent 2011 local 
elections (Gallego 2018).  The allocation of EMA hurricane disaster aid awards in Florida has been 
shown to have had a positive turnout effect on Republican voters in the November 2004 election, but 
a negative effect on Democratic opposition turnout (Chen 2013).  Inter-organisational blame games 
may also open up that can be exploited.  In the US, it has been shown that if the president rejects 
requests by governors for federal assistance, the president is punished and the governor is rewarded 
at the polls (Gasper and Reeves 2011). 
Postponement can pose alternative threats to equality of contestation, however.  Postponement can 
place additional pressures on independent candidates who may lack the resources that established 
political parties have.  The decision to postpone the London Mayoral election of 2020 to 2021, led to 
a prominent independent candidate withdrawing, claiming that it would be difficult to continue the 
campaign for another whole year without sufficient resources (Lydall 2020). 
The setting of a new revised date also provides the opportunity for elite statecraft, as incumbents seek 
to set a schedule that would boost their chances of electoral success.  Elections in Montenegro and 
Croatia were postponed in early 2000 in response to the COVID-19 crisis. Incumbents were thought 
to be timing the new electoral event so that it would fall on the back of a bounce for the management 
of the crisis, but before a post-COVID recession took place.  Montenegro President Milo Djukanovic, 
for example, was reported to be considering a snap poll in the summer of 2020, rather than one in the 
Autumn which might see an economic dip because of the dependency on the struggling tourism sector 
(Vladisavljevic et al. 2020).  It is therefore notable that elections can be both put back and brought 
forward as a result of a natural disaster.  
The effects of natural disasters on equality of contestation can also vary across political systems. Flores 
and Smith (2013) report that in large coalition systems, often described as democracies, disasters have 
little effect on levels of protest or leader survival.  But the electoral prospects can be shaped by the 
number of falities.  Meanwhile, in more autocratic systems, disasters can increase protest and reduces 
leadership survival.  They argue that disasters can concentrate displaced people, which makes it easier 
for them to mobilse and protest against the government.  It can also reduce the state’s repressive 
capacity. 
 
Equality of participation 
 
A third principle that should underpin elections is equality of participation.  Democratic elections, at 
their best, are characterised by the high turnout and equal levels of participation across different 
groups in a society. Without this, the result of an election may be shaped by some groups more than 
others. Historically, many polities often have deep inequality in levels of participation across social 
and economic groups (Fraga 2018).  This is a major threat to political equality within a polity because 
these uneven levels of participation are often partially driven by uneven access to resources and 
external factors (James and Garnett 2020).  
 
There is nuanced evidence that turnout is likely to be lower than it might otherwise be during natural 
disasters.  Floods in Calgary in 2016 were not thought by Bodet et al. (2016)  to have affected turnout, 
when flood-affected areas were compared with those which were not.  However, other studies point 
to more nuanced effects.  Examing the 2006 mayoral election in New Orleans following Hurrican 
Katrina, Sinclair et al. (2011) show that living in flood-affected areas did affect voting.  Their rationale 
was cost-based: those who were more likely to be displaced, possibly now having to temporarily live 
outside New Orleans would need to take extraordinary steps to vote.  They were indeed found to be 
less likely to vote. However, there were other dynamics.  Those who were severely flooded, having 
experienced more than 6 ft of flooding were more likely to participate in the election than those who 
experienced less flooding. This was attributed towards state efforts to make voting more accessible 
for these disadvantaged groups.  It was also attributed to motivational factors: those who are deeply 
affected by natural disasters may become more civic-minded after the event.   
Many of the elections that were held during the spread of COVID-19 in 2020 saw turnout drops. Figure 
1 summarises the change in turnout against the previous election for countries that held national 
elections during the pandemic.  The figure covers elections held between 1 January and 19 July 2020 
and only includes those countries where there were reported cases of COVID-19.  The accumulated 
number of cases by election day are indicated in brackets using data from the World Health 
Organisation.   The mean change in turnout was -6.21 percentage points.  The greatest fall was in Syria, 
which the government attributed to citizen’s concerns about coronavirus (al-Jazaeri 2020), but there 
were also broad electoral integrity concerns (Ibrahim 2020). Guinea saw a major decline, but there 
was an opposition boycott of the election (Fofana and Philipps 2020).   Turnout in the Iranian 
parliamentary elections hit a rock-bottom 42.3 per cent during the COVID-19 pandemic, the lowest 
since the 1979 revolution.  Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed the low turnout on 
the ‘negative propaganda’ about Coronavirus (Al Jazeera 2020).  Media sources reported that 
Coronavirus was discouraging citizens to vote in Mali, which announced its first coronavirus death, 
just hours before the polls opened (Mules 2020).  There was also some significant falls in local 
elections.  The first round of French elections saw turnout drop to 44.7 percent, a record low, and 
substantially lower than the last contests in 2014 of 63.6 per cent.  After the polls closed, the French 
Prime Minister admitted that the ‘high abstention rate shows the increasing concern of our citizens in 
the face of the epidemic we are up against’ (Momtaz, Braun, and Kayali 2020).  The Burundi election 
saw much higher turnout, but it was the first ‘competitive’ election with the incumbent standing down 
(Burke 2020).  Extensive special measures were put in place in Korea (see below). 
  
Figure 1: Change in turnout in national elections held during January-June 2020 compared to the 
previous election. Source: authors, using data from International IDEA (2020b) and the World Health 
Organisation WHO (2020a).  Voter age population turnout used. 
The United States had its first reported case of local transmission on 26 February 2020 (Schumaker 
2020).  Figure 2 presents the change in turnout in the primaries held between 1 March and 9 June 
2020, against 2016 turnout levels, where turnout data was available from the United States Elections 
Project. The number of reported COVID cases in each state on election day is in brackets, followed by 
the election date.  There was an mean fall in these contests was 1.61 percentage points.  There were 
falls across March with a more mixed picture in June.  Attributing change in turnout level to 
Coronavirus in the primaries is difficult because the nature of the contests differed to 2016.  Bernie 
Sanders dropped out of the Democratic race on 8 April, establishing Joseph R. Biden Jr. as the 
presumptive nominee and making the presential primaries less important.  In 2016 Hiliary Clinton was 
not nominated as the presumptive nominee until 6 June.  However, there were also local contests that 
would have been important in sustaining interest in some states.  Mitigating strategies, such as the 
expansion of postal voting was also put in place by May with states such as Wyoming, Hawaii, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Alaska and Oregon voting by mail (Corasaniti and Saul 2020).   
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Figure 2: Change in turnout in US Primaries between 2020 and 2016.  Source: authors using data from 
the United States Election Project (McDonald 2020) and the New York Times (2020).  
The threat to voters posed by an epidemic is different in nature to a flood.  The logic behind these 
declines are likely to include citizens not wishing to risk their physical health and the health of their 
family members.  Holding elections in such circumstances therefore means that turnout is likely to be 
much lower than it might otherwise be.  In the midst of a presidential election year, about two-thirds 
of US citizens (66%) said that they wouldn’t feel comfortable going to a polling place to vote (Horowitz, 
Igielnik, and Arditi 2020, 4).  However, the situation is further complicated if turnout is likely to 
disproportionately decline amongst certain groups.  COVID-19, for example, was reported by the WHO 
be more dangerous for older people and those with underlying health conditions (WHO 2019).  UK 
studies also found that the risk of dying from COVID-19 was higher amongst Black, Asian and Minority 
Ethnic (BAME) groups than in White ethnic groups (Public Health England 2020a, 2020b). It is therefore 
possible that these citizens might be especially less likely to vote than other citizens.  Given that 
citizens that have physical disabilities are likely to vote, this would sharpen an underlying inequality in 
the electoral process (Johnson and Powell 2020), likewise for minority ethnic groups.  Ironically, older 
voters are usually those more likely to vote.  Holding elections when specific groups are more likely to 
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have their health at risk would clearly mean that appropriate strategies would need to be put in place 
by electoral authorities process.  James and Garnett (2020, 117) define inclusive voting practices as 
‘policy instruments which reduce inequality in the electoral process for citizens, including, but not 
limited to the voter turnout and registration gap’.   
 
Electoral management delivery 
 
A fourth principle is robust electoral management quality. Electoral laws can be designed in ways 
which support and strengthen democracy, but like all public policies, they require successful 
implementation on the ground.  Convenience, quality of service, transparency, professionalism, 
probity, cost-effectiveness, citizen and stakeholder satisfaction are all hallmarks of good equality 
election delivery, just as they are for other public services (James 2020, 66).   
 
Emergencies can, however, pose major logistical problems which could force elections into major 
compromises, or even make them undeliverable.  The delivery of elections are reliant on huge 
workforces in order to deliver an election (James 2019), which may suddenly not be available.  Many 
countries rely on a temporary workforce close to election day to serve as poll workers, presiding 
officers and poll clerks.  The hours that they work can be very lengthy and issues with the recruitment 
of these workers is often commonly reported even in ‘normal’ times (Burden and Milyo 2015).  In the 
UK, for example, the poll worker labour force is made up of mostly women (63%) with an average age 
of 53 and they are very often retired.  In some countries serving as a poll worker is a compulsory civic 
duty, so there might be a more evenly distributed demographic of staff (Clark and James 2017).  A 
natural disaster could suddenly pose recruitment and absenteeism problems threatening the delivery 
of the election. The 2020 Chicago Primary elections were held while President Trump advised 
Americans to avoid groups of 10 or more.  “The city is just understaffed,” one election official said and 
citizens went to the polls (CBS Chicago 2020).  Poll worker recruitment problems were also reported 
in the much-criticised Georgia primary (Thanawala 2020). 
The postponement of elections will bring financial challenges for the electoral management body 
These could include the sunk costs involved in preparing for the election such as staff and the hire of 
premises which might not be refundable.  Should they be refundable, then there is an ethical question 
for electoral management bodies because claiming refunds might have a knock on consequences for 
others who might already be experiencing financial hardship. In the event of postponement there 
might be future challenges involved in securing sufficient funds to run the election.  Public sector 
finances are likely to be stretched because of increased spending on healthcare business support 
packages, or other wider response to the emergency.  The Mongolian President proposed postponing 
parliamentary elections in 2020 to divert resources to COVID-19 (Xinhua 2020). 
Postponements can then also lead to a future backlog of electoral contests.  Elections may need to be 
held the following year, perhaps concurrent to elections of other types of elections.  The 
postponement of the English local elections in 2020 meant that they would be simultaneously be held 
in 2021 alongside ‘a bumper set of polls’ including those for the Scottish and Welsh parliaments, 
English councils, police and crime commissioners, London mayor, London assembly, regional mayors 
and local mayors (Clark 2020).  Many of these have different legal frameworks and electoral systems 
which poses a threat of confusion for citizens, and implementation challenges for administrators.  
When different types of elections are run simultaneously, problems are more likely to occur (Clark 
2017). 
Supply chains are also likely to be affected.  The rapid outbreak of COVID-19 meant that there were 
global shortages of personal protection equipment for medical staff, as well as ventilators.  Lockdowns 
also affected the transportation industry which meant the slower delivery of food and other supplies.  
In these circumstances, the supply of other essential items for an election will suddenly become 
difficult.  Electoral officials in Chicago reported that equipment was not delivered on time for their 
primary elections (CBS Chicago 2020). 
Institutionalisation 
A fifth principle is that constitutional rules surrounding elections should provide institutional certainty 
and clarity about the rules of the game.  The scheduling of elections provides such institutional 
certainty that a contest will take place.  This incentivises rivals to challenge the incumbent through 
the ballot box rather than through violence or other means.  The certainty of holding an election 
encourages trust amongst citizens in the system because they come to believe that there will be an 
opportunity to remove the incumbent from office. 
Natural disasters can, however, undermine much of this. It will immediately create uncertainty about 
whether an election is deliverable as scheduled.  Proposals for postponement will immediately unpick 
the certainty of electoral rules, especially in presidential systems of government that are characterised 
by strict fixed-terms of office.  The removal or relaxation of institutional certainty creates opportune 
statecraft moments for incumbents, who might often cite Article 4 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights in support of their case for postponement.  They are likely to be able to set 
the timetable for the new election that is favourable in terms of shifts in opinion polls. They could 
postpone elections indefinitely and claim a prolonged mandate.  Hungarian prime minister, Viktor 
Orban saw legislation through parliament which had the aim of ‘strengthening and extending the 
decrees issued during the state of emergency and give the government authorisation to issue decrees 
for an indefinite term as long as the state of emergency is in effect’.  This included provisions that no 
local or national elections or referendums could be held until the end of the state of emergency.  An 
international outcry followed and claims were made that Coronavirus had killed its first democracy.  
The opposition pressed for a 90-day deadline for the emergency provisions claiming that if it is 
‘justified to empower Viktor Orbán to govern by decrees until the end of his life…we call that a 
kingdom’ (Zoltán 2020). 
Even where power-politics tactics are not being played, the sudden uncertainty in the electoral 
timetable might erode trust amongst rivals and citizens.  Accusations from oppositions that 
incumbents are postponing for partisan reasons will undermine legitimacy within the electoral 
process, and citizens often take cues from candidates and parties (Vonnahme and Miller 2013).  
Politicians have an important gate-keeper role in fostering trust in the system (Levitsky and Ziblatt 
2018), but might be inclined to ‘points score’ against incumbents. 
When the decision to postpone the election during a natural disaster yields powers that translate to 
political and electoral advantages of the incumbent, then the election would fit into the ‘cancelled 
elections’ category of our typology in Table 1.  However, when the postponement does not diminish 
political opportunities for other political actors – and possibly even opens space for more solidarity 
and unity - then it would fit more neatly into the humanitarian postponement category.   
Counteracting the effects of natural disasters 
What policy instruments could be introduced to still hold an election during or immediately after a 
natural disaster?  One obvious strategy would include the introduction of early voting, if this is not 
available, whereby citizens can cast their ballot over several days.  ‘Voter traffic’ can then be spread 
over out rather bunched into one day.  This would help to establish social distancing during an 
epidemic, but would also even out the demand on depleted services following events such as 
earthquakes and floods. In the April 2020 South Korean parliamentary election provisions were made 
to encourage early voter turnout so that polling stations were not too busy on polling day, and a record 
26.7 per cent of voters voted early (Spinelli 2020). Early voting would require further resourcing 
because of the cost of additional staff and hire of premises and the capacity of the state to deliver this 
might not be available.  However, it is a ‘low-tech’ solution that could often be easily upscaled. 
There are also opportunities for extending the provision of remote voting mechanisms where they are 
not already in place, or scaling them up where it already exists.  Internet voting remains relatively 
untested and there are increased concerns about cyber-security.  Introducing it at short notice is also 
impractical (Krimmer, Duenas-Cid, and Krivonosova 2020).  However, all-postal elections have been 
held in many jurisdictions in the past (Killer and Stiller 2019).  In Bavaria, Germany, all-postal voting 
mechanisms were therefore introduced during the COVID-19 crisis which completely excluded in-
person voting in order to mitigate health risks of contagion posed through close contact (Schwarz 
2020).  As noted above, postal voting was expanded in the US primaries.  Remote voting does involve 
trade-offs, which could undermine other aspects of the electoral process in some contexts.  Ballot 
secrecy could be undermined (Elklit and Maley 2019).  There have also been concerns about postal 
voting and electoral fraud (Wilks-Heeg 2008), with specific communities often claimed to be more 
vulnerable to undue influence (Hill et al. 2017).  However, in comparison to holding no election, this 
could be an important inclusive voting practice to keep the electoral show on the road, especially 
given that cases of electoral fraud are often low, at least in strong democracies.  
There is also a danger, however, in introducing postal voting where electoral administrators have no 
prior experience of this.  Postal voting has often been trialled before being implemented more widely 
(James 2011) to enable systems to be tested and new procedures to be learnt.  The late adoption of 
new practices is therefore likely to put considerable strain on electoral officials and threaten electoral 
management quality.  Last-minute changes to electoral law can also threaten legal certainty and 
therefore institutionalisation.   Electoral officials can be left with inadequate preparation time to 
adjust election materials and training staff.  There might be a perception amongst voters that last-
minute amendments have been introduced to favour one party over others.  The Council of Europe 
has therefore previously set out that electoral rules should not be open to amendment less than one 
year before an election (Venice Commission 2002, 10).  States that have rushed to implement postal 
voting have often hit logistical problems.  For example, legislation was proposed in Parliament to hold 
the 2020 Polish Presidential election entirely by postal ballot rather than postpone during the COVID-
19 pandemic.  Major concerns were raised by OSCE/OHDIR, however, that these last minute changes 
would threaten the stability of electoral legisaltion and legal certainty (OSCE/OHDIR 2020). In 
eventuality, the election had to be postponed only hours before the poll.  Postal voting would also be 
difficult to implement in areas where the postal service infrastructure has been hit by the natural 
disaster, or where it was already of poor quality.   
Further policy instruments specific to a pandemic include the provision of personal protection 
equipment, as was undertaken in South Korea during the legislative election of April 2020.  Safeguards 
introduced into polling stations under a Code of Conduct for Voters included requirements to wear 
facemasks while queuing, the provision of hand sanitizers and gloves to votes and temperature checks 
– with citizens showing signs of ill-health then being re-directed to special polling stations with even 
higher degrees of protection.  Turnout in South Korea rose by 8.2 per cent against the previous 
legislative election in 2016 (Spinelli 2020).  The capacity of the South Korean state, however, is not 
replicable worldwide.  The introduction of some these provisions would therefore be difficult in other 
circumstances.   
Conclusions: the postponement paradox 
Elections are at the bedrock of the democratic process.  They are indispensable for bringing rule by 
citizens as opposed to narrow political or sectional elites.  There are often calls for them to be 
postponed during emergency situations and natural disasters, but there has been very little academic 
attention on this issue.  Most research has instead focused on the integrity of the elections that do 
take place.  The elections they do not take place have a crucial importance if we are to understand 
democracy, democratisation and electoral integrity, however.   This article has therefore set out a new 
typology of reasons why elections might be postponed to provide a richer understanding of why 
elections do not take place.  Many of these occasions, those that we refer to as ‘cancelled’ elections 
do equate to more blatant power grabs.  Rulers might also use political pressure to annul elections 
where their outcomes are not in their favour.  In many cases, however, elections might be delayed for 
other reasons.  There might be a need to put democratic reforms in place or for technical issues to be 
resolved first, for example.  The risk of loss of life during natural disasters means that there are also 
humanitarian reasons for postponing.  
The article has argued that the case for postponing elections should be evaluated by democratic 
concepts of electoral integrity, rather than international laws and practices.  The article has set out 
five dimensions of electoral integrity and considered how they can all be negatively affected by natural 
disasters.  The effects of natural disasters are going to be context-specific, but the article has shown 
how opportunities for deliberation, contestation and participation will all be affected and electoral 
management quality will suffer. The postponement paradox is that, however, postponing will break 
institutional certainty and this may lead to situations of statecraft and partisan scrobbling which could 
trigger democratic breakdown and trust in the system – especially presidential systems.  Those states 
where trust is embedded into political institutions may be able to weather this storm.  Given that trust 
in politicians and political institutions such as parliaments or the courts has become precarious in 
established democracies as well as fragile democracies, there are difficult waters to be navigated.   
Election postponement may be democratically legitimate in a variety of circumstances, including 
where there are natural disasters if there is a humanitarian case: i.e. there is a threat to human life 
and health.  This is not to say that political actors will seek partisan advantage in postponement.  As 
this article has noted, these strategies might include pushing to postpone when poll ratings are poor 
to a later point, or they may seek to permanently cancel elections.  But there are also strategic 
opportunities for a partisan advantage during the emergency.  They might reduce opportunities for 
rivals to campaign during the electoral cycle with ‘lockdowns’ they while continue to campaign 
themselves and use state resources.  They might redirect emergency relief funds for pork-barrelling 
or undertake de facto ‘voter suppression’ by not taking sufficient action to ensure equality of 
participation.  Where the principal factor for the postponement is an attempt to gain partisan 
postponement, this postponement would fall more closely into the category of a cancelled election, 
not a humanitarian postponement.   
The article has further considered some of the mitigating policies to address the natural disaster.  
There is no one-size fits all solution because the nature of the natural disaster will vary.  Low-tech 
solutions such as early voting will tend to be universally appropriate for accommodating elections to 
pandemics. Practices such as postal voting, however, will be more successful where there is prior 
experience amongst electoral officials, no threat of intimidation and a robust postal service.  It may 
make more of a difference, however, not what decision is made, but how that decision is made.  The 
decision to hold or postpone elections will inevitably have proponents and opponents.  If options are 
openly discussed and all major stakeholders are able to contribute to it, then controversies and 
blockades can be reduced.  This is to say that the option chosen may be less critical than the 
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